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THE VALIDITY OF SEC RULE 3b-9 WHICH
REQUIRES BANKS TO REGISTER AS BROKER-DEALERS
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act)' requires persons
doing business as brokers2 or dealers3 to register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). 4 In registering with the SEC, brokers and
dealers disclose information that helps the SEC ensure that broker-dealers
comply with all applicable securities laws.' Congress imposed the registration
requirement on broker-dealers primarily to protect investors from unfair
practices in securities transactions. 6 In passing the '34 Act, however, Congress

1. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1982) (broker is person trading securities for accounts of
others).
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1982) (dealer is person trading in securities for personal
account). The definitions of "broker" and "dealer" comprehend only persons who trade
securities as part of a regular business. N. WOLFSON, R. PHILIPS & T. Russo, REGULATION OF
BROKERS, DEALERS & SECURITIES MARKETS § 1.04 (1977).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (1982) (prohibiting brokers and dealers from trading
securities without registering with Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)); 15 U.S.C. §
78d (1982) (statute establishing SEC to administer '34 Act). Under the '34 Act, brokers and
dealers may not trade securities in interstate commerce unless they have registered with the
SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (1982). Registered broker-dealers must conform to the applicable
requirements of the '34 Act and all regulations that the SEC adopts pursuant to the '34 Act,
including periodic reporting requirements, unreasonable commission prohibitions, and antimanipulation provisions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1982) (authorizing SEC to impose periodic
reporting requirements on broker-dealers); 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1982) (prohibiting unreasonable
broker-dealer commissions); 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1982) (broker-dealer antimanipulation
provision). See generally T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 232-37 (1985) (overview
of broker-dealer registration requirement).
5. See S. JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIS MARKETS 15-17 (1977). To satisfy the
broker-dealer registration requirement, a registrant must file with the SEC a statement that
discloses the registrant's financial condition, organizational structure, securities operations, and
other information that the SEC in its rulemaking capacity requires. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(1)
(1982) (authorizing SEC to adopt rules for broker-dealer registration); see also 17 C.F.R. §
229.101 (1982) (listing specific information that SEC requires registering broker-dealers to disclose).
See generally T. HAZEN, supra note 4, at 233 (overview of broker-dealer registration). The SEC
uses the broker-dealer registration information to police broker-dealer activities. See S. JAFFE,
supra at 17 (discussing consequences of broker-dealer registration with SEC).
6. See Blaise D'Antoni & Assoc., Inc. v. SEC, 290 F.2d 688, 689 (5th Cir. 1961)
(Congress subjected brokers to scrutiny of SEC to further purpose of '34 Act to create fair
market for investors); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1982) (broker-dealer registration requirements);
S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4, 78 Cong. Rec. 2264-72 (1934), reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT 1934, at Item 34 (1973) (broker-dealer registration is
necessary to prevent abuses in securities transactions) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History].
Congress enacted the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to effect fair dissemination of trading
information and to ensure that broker-dealers deal honestly with investors. See Radzanower v.
Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) (purpose of '34 Act is to provide fair mechanism
for pricing securities and to prevent undue advantage among investors trading securities); see
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exempted banks7 from the broker-dealer registration requirement. 8 Congress
apparently determined that requiring banks to register as broker-dealers was
unnecessary because the Glass-Steagall Act9 prohibited banks from participating in most broker-dealer activities. 0 Nevertheless, the federal banking

also Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (purpose of '34 Act is to prevent dishonesty
in business of trading securities); H.R. REP. No, 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1934), reprinted
in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at Item 18 (regulation of stock exchange is necessary to protect
investing public). See generallyT. HAZEN, supra note 4, at 6-8 (1985) (discussing fair play objectives of '34 Act). In promulgating the '34 Act, Congress intended to restore the investing public's
confidence in America's financial markets after the stock market crash of 1929. See T. HAZEN,
supra note 4, at 6 (historical context of '34 Act); see also lanni, "Security" Under The GlassSteagall Act And The FederalSecurities Acts of 1933 and 1934: The Direction of The Supreme
Courts Analysis, 100 BANK. L. J. 100, 103-04 (1983) (influence of stock market crash on enactment of '34 Act), Unlike the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act), which focuses on corporate distributions of securities, the '34 Act governs all aspects of securities transactions, See T. HAZEN, supra
note 4, at 232 (observing comprehensive character of '34 Act).
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(6) (1982) (defining "bank" as national bank, Federal Reserve
member bank, or state bank that receives deposits. and has fiduciary duties similar to those of
national bank).
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)-(5) (1982) (excluding banks from definitions of "broker"
and "dealer"); see also SEC Rule on Broker-Dealer Registrationfor Banks, [Jul.-Dec.] SEc.
REG. & REP. (BNA) No. 28, at 1269 (July 1, 1985) (noting total bank exemption from brokerdealer registration requirement prior to, promulgation of rule 3b-9). Congress exempted banks
from the broker-dealer registration requirement by imposing the requirement only on persons
doing business as brokers or dealers and excluding banks from the definitions of "broker" and
"dealer." See 15 U.SC. § 78o (1982) (requiring persons doing business as brokers or dealers
to register with SEC); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)-(5) (1982) (excluding banks from definitions of
broker and dealer). Since broker-dealer registration subjects persons to the broker-dealer
regulations of the '34 Act, Congress exempted banks from the broker-dealer regulations of the
'34 Act by exempting banks from the broker-dealer registration requirement. See Note,
Regulation of Bank Securities Activities, 41 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 1187, 1190, n.13 (1983)
(explaining how Congress exempted banks from broker-dealer regulations of '34 Act).
9. Glass-Steagall Act §§ 16, 20, 21,r 32, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377, 378(a), 78 (1982).
10. See id. (prohibiting banks from offering most brokerage services). Congress passed
the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933 to erect a barrier between the banking business and the investment
business. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 639 (1971) (bank engaging in mutual
investment business violated Glass-Steagall Act); see also 77 Coso, REc. 3,835 (1933) (comment
of Sen. Steagall who stated that purpose of Glass-Steagall Act is to steer banks back to business
of banking); 75 CONG. Rc. 9,912 (1932) (comment of Sen. Bulkey who stated necessity of
keeping banks out of investment securities business). In enacting the Glass-Steagall Act, Congress
determined that banks could not solicit securities accounts and simultaneously provide their
customers the disinterested and cautious banking service needed to restore the public's confidence
in banks after the bank of the United States collapsed in 1930. Investment Co. Inst., 401 U.S.
at 634; see also HearingsPursuantto S. Res. 71 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 40 (1931) (attributing failure of Bank of United
States in 1930 to securities activities with affiliates); S. Rep. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-10
(1933) (stock market decline damaged commercial banks due to their trading iri
and ownership
of speculative securities). To combat the mischiefs inherent in banks handling securities accounts,
Congress in drafting the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited banks fromconducting brokerage services,
dealing in securities, and underwriting or distributing stock issues. See Glass-Steagall Act §§ 16,
20, 21, 32, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377, 378(a), 78 (19821 (prohibiting banks from offering brokerage
services).
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regulators" recently have interpreted the Glass-Steagall Act to permit banks
to offer brokerage services almost identical to services offered by registered
broker-dealers.' 2
To capitalize on the relaxed standards of the Glass-Steagall Act, banks
have entered the securities brokerage business aggressively. 3 Congress, how-

11. See Note, supra note 8, at 1190-91 n.16. The primary federal agencies responsible for
regulating the banking industry in the United States are the Comptroller of the Currency
(Comptroller), the Federal Reserve Board (Federal Reserve), and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC). Id. The Comptroller regulates the federally chartered national banks. See
12 U.S.C. §§ 21-24, 26-27 (1982) (delineating authority and duties of Comptroller). The Federal
Reserve regulates bank holding companies and state chartered banks belonging to the Federal
Reserve System. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982) (authority to govern bank holding companies); 12 U.S.C. §§ 321, 324-325 (1982) (Federal Reserve regulates state member banks). The
FDIC regulates those state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System but have
federal deposit insurance. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1815, 1817 (1982).
12. See SEC Rule, supra note 8, at 1263. In 1982, the Comptroller permitted a national
bank to form a broker-dealer subsidiary registered with the SEC. See Decision of Comptroller
of Currency Establishing an Operating Subsidiary to be Known as Security Paci/c Discount
Brokerage Services, Inc., [Rulings-Decisions] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 99,284 (AUG. 26,
1982). The following year, the Federal Reserve approved an application from the BankAmerica
Corporation, a bank holding company, to acquire a discount brokerage firm. See Order of the
FederalReserve System Approving the Acquisition of Charles Schwab & Co. by BankAmerica
Corporation, 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 105 (1983). The United States District Court for the District
of Columbia upheld the Federal Reserve's approval of BankAmerica's application in Securities
Indus. As'n v. Comptrollerof the Currency. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the
Currency, 577 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D.D.C. 1983) (Glass-Steagall does not prohibit banks from
owning brokerage firms as subsidiaries). Soon after granting BankAmerica permission to purchase a discount brokerage firm, the Federal Reserve promulgated a rule permitting bank holding
companies to enter the discount brokerage and securities credit lending business. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.25(bX15) (1985) (amendment to make discount securities brokerage and securities credit
lending permissible activities for bank holding companies). In addition, the FDIC has indicated
that insured nonmember banks may establish subsidiaries to deal in and underwrite securities
and even to conduct brokerage business internally. See General Counsel's Opinion No. 6 - The
Legality of Discount Brokerage Services When Offered By Insured Nonmember Banks, 48 Fed.
Reg. 22,989 (1983). The question whether current banking practices in brokerage activities violate
the Glass-Steagall Act, nevertheless, remains unanswered. See Note, A Banker'sAdventures in
Brokerland: Looking Through Glass-Steagallat DiscountBrokerage Services, 81 Mich. L. Rev.
1498, 1500-01 (1983) (practice of banks doing brokerage business implicates Glass-Steagall Act);
see also Pitt & Williams, The Glass-SteagallAct: Key Issues for the FinancialServices Industry,
I1 See. Reg. L. J. 234, 237 (1983) (Glass-Steagall barrier between investment banking and commercial banking); supra note 8 and accompanying text (background of Glass-Steagall Act).
13. See SEC Rule, supra note 8, at 1262-63. In 1984, the American Bankers Association
(ABA) estimated that more than 1000 banks in the United States currently engage in securities
activities. Id. In some cases, bank employees take securities investment orders from customers
and forward the orders to nonbank brokers who process the orders. See SEC Rule, supra note
8, at 1262. Under this system, the bank typically shares the commission with the broker
executing the trade. Id. In addition, banks currently aim aggressive promotional campaigns at
existing and even prospective customers to solicit brokerage business that the banks, in some
cases, handle internally. Id. Thus, rather than merely providing traditional accommodation
services to existing customers, banks frequently offer services indistinguishable from brokerdealer services and receive transaction-related compensation. Id.; see Banks May Execute
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ever, did not equip the banking regulators with statutes designed to protect
investors trading securities through banks.' 4 Rather, Congress designed the
banking regulations to restore financial stability to the banking industry after
the collapse of the Bank of the United States in 1930.5 Consequently, a void
in investor protection developed as banks entered the brokerage business
because the '34 Act, although regulating persons doing brokerage business,
exempted banks from the broker-dealer regulations.1 6 To fill the new void in

Customers' Instructions to Buy and Sell Shares in Tax-Exempt MutualFunds [Current Transfer
Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 85,502 (Mar. 8, 1985) (letter from Peter Liebesman, Legal
Advisor, Services Division of the Comptroller, noting similarity of bank brokerage activities to
activities of traditional broker).
14. See Ianni, supra note 6, at 103-05 & 121-23 (discussing different orientations of
federal law regulating banks and federal law regulating securities industry). Congress designed
the federal securities regulations to provide investors with complete, material information in the
securities market and to protect investors from fraud in securities transactions. See supra notes
1-5 and accompanying text (orientation of federal securities regulation). In contrast, Congress
designed the banking laws to prohibit banks from becoming unduly risky enterprises and to
minimize the conflicts of interest inherent in banks doing brokerage business. See Ianni, supra
note 8, at 103-05.
In accordance with the different orientations of federal banking law and federal securities
law, the securities regulations address specific problems that the banking regulations do not
address. See id. at 103-105 & 121-123. For example, broker-dealers must pass qualifying
examinations to satisfy minimum competency standards. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(aX4)-(5) & §
78o(b)(7) (1982) (broker-dealers must meet competency standards promulgated by SEC); see
also NASD MANUAL (CCH) 1102A, at 1052-1055 (National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
by-law requiring broker-dealers to pass qualifying test); 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2304 (1983)
(New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rule 304a requires members of NYSE to meet qualifying
standards). In contrast, federal banking regulations provide no mechanisms to insure the competency of bank employees executing securities trades. See Note, supra note 8, at 1195-96. Moreover,
unlike federal securities regulations, federal banking laws do not require persons doing business
as brokers to supervise employees handling securities transactions for customer accounts. See
15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1982) ('34 Act requirement that broker-dealers supervise personnel).
Also unlike securities regulations, banking regulations do not impose advertising and recordkeeping requirements on persons doing brokerage business. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-6 (broker
must maintain records of customer accounts and all transactions); AMER. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH)
9490, at 2683 (1983) (advertisements must reflect legitimate business character); 2 N. Y.S.E. Guide
(CCH) 2472 (1983) (prohibiting misleading advertising by broker-dealers). Finally, federal banking regulations, unlike securities regulations, do not address the need for persons conducting
brokerage business to tailor investment recommendations to customers' investment objectives.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1983) (broker-dealers advising customers must recommend only
suitable investments); see also NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2152, at 2051 (1983) (requiring brokers
to recommend investments suitable to customers' particular needs). See generally Note, supra
note 8, at 1191-97 (overview of differences between bank and broker-dealer regulation respecting
brokerage services).
15. See lanni, supra note 8, at 103-05 (purpose of federal banking regulations is to make
banks safe financially); supra note 10 (purpose of Glass-Steagall Act was to stabilize banking
industry after collapse of Bank of United States).
16. See SEC Rule, supra note 8, at 1264 (SEC's determination that increase in bank
securities activities created deficiency in federal protection of investors trading securities); see
also supra note 14 and accompanying text (comparing banking regulation to securities regulation).
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federal protection of securities investors, the SEC recently adopted rule 3b9 which requires banks doing brokerage business to register as broker-dealers
7
with the SEC.'
Under rule 3b-9, a bank must register as a broker-dealer if the bank
publicly solicits brokerage business, 8 gives investment advice for compensation, 19 or deals in or underwrites securities. 20 Significantly, rule 3b-9 applies

17. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9 (1985) (banks doing brokerage business must register as
broker-dealers with SEC); see also SEC Rule, supra note 8, at 1264 (purpose of rule 3b-9 i's to
fill void in securities regulation caused by banks handling securities transactions not subject to
securities regulation). In adopting rule 3b-9, the SEC endorsed the "regulation by function"
approach to securities regulation. See SEC Rule, supra note 8, at 1264 n.19 (adopting regulation
by function theory of securities regulation); see also Securities Activities of Depository Institutions: Hearingson S. 1220 Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1982) (statement of John S.
R. Shad, Chairman, SEC, endorsing regulation by function approach to securities regulation).
The regulation by function approach focuses on the character of the securities activities being
conducted and ignores the outmoded industry classifications of bank and broker-dealer which
became blurred as banks entered the brokerage business. SEC Rule, supra note 8, at 1264 n.19.
Applying the regulation by function approach to banks doing brokerage business, the SEC, in
adopting rule 3b-9, determined that the investor protection purpose of the '34 Act required
applying the coordinated system of federal securities regulation to bank brokerage activities.
SEC Rule, supra note 8, at 1264.
18. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9(a)(1) (1985) (public solicitation prong of rule 3b-9). The
public solicitation prong of rule 3b-9 applies only to banks that promote internal brokerage
services. SEC Rule, supra note 8, 1265. For example, rule 3b-9 applies to banks that advertise
the availability of their brokerage services in a newspaper or send their customers literature
promoting self-directed individual retirement accounts. Id. The public solicitation prong of rule
3b-9 does not apply, though, to banks promoting the brokerage services of nonbank registered
broker-dealers as an accommodation to bank customers. Id. Therefore, the public solicitation
prong of rule 3b-9 will not disturb "networking" arrangements, which are contractual agreements
between banks and independent broker-dealers in which the broker-dealers execute trades for
the accounts of bank customers. Furthermore, the public solicitation prong of rule 3b-9 will not
affect banks that incorporate or acquire subsidiaries to provide brokerage services on the banks'
behalf for bank customers. Id. Accordingly, banks that participate in networking arrangements
or provide brokerage services through subsidiaries may advertise aggressively without activating
the public solicitation prong of rule 3b-9. Id.
19. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9(a)(2) (1985) (transaction-related compensation prong of rule
3b-9). Banks traditionally have provided investment advice for individual and trust accounts at
the request of customers as an accommodation to existing customers. Kurucza, Brokerage
Activities and Investment Banking, INST. ON SEC. REG. 341 (1984). In providing investment
advice, banks have not profited directly but, rather, have billed customers at cost. Id. Although
rule 3b-9 will not disturb the customary arrangement, the transaction-related compensation
prong will impose the registration requirement on banks that charge customers a fee in excess
of the cost of executing a trade or the cost of giving investment advice. SEC Rule, supra note
8, at 1266-67.
20. See C.F.R. § 240.3b-9(a)(3) (1985) ("dealing in and underwriting" prong of rule 3b9). The Glass-Steagall Act prohibits banks from dealing in and underwriting securities. 12
U.S.C. § 378 (1982). The "dealing in and underwriting" prong of rule 3b-9, however, applies
to dealing and underwriting activities as defined in the '33 and '34 Acts, respectively. The
meanings of the terms "dealing" and "underwriting" in the '33 and '34 Acts may differ from
the meanings of "dealing" and "underwriting" in the Glass-Steagall Act. SEC Rule, supra note
12, at 1268-70; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1982) (definition of "underwriter" in '33 Act); 15
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only to banks conducting brokerage operations internally. 2' Therefore, banks

wishing to do brokerage business may avoid the broker-dealer registration
requirement by handling customer
accounts through affiliates or subsidiaries
22
registered as broker-dealers.
Regardless of whether banks conduct brokerage business internally or
through affiliates or subsidiaries, however, rule 3b-9 will cost banks money.
For example, banks choosing to conduct brokerage activities internally will
incur the administrative costs of registering with the SEC pursuant to rule
3b-9, complying with the periodic reporting requirements of the '34 Act, and
retaining counsel for securities law advice. 23 Furthermore, banks handling
customer accounts through affiliates registered as broker-dealers must forfeit
the affiliates' share of brokerage commissions.2 Moreover, banks that
establish registered subsidiaries to provide brokerage services may incur legal
fees in incorporating or acquiring subsidiaries and also may bear administrative expenses in registering those subsidiaries as broker-dealers pursuant to
25
the '34 Act.

Objecting to the impending SEC regulation, diminished brokerage revenues, and increased costs, the American Bankers Association (ABA) petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to set
aside rule 3b-9. 26 In American Bankers Association v. SEC,27 the ABA
U.S.C. § 77c(a)(5) (1982) (dealer is person buying and selling stock for his own account); 12
U.S.C. § 378 (1982) (Glass-Steagall Act's prohibition against banks dealing in or underwriting
securities).
21. SEC Rule, supra note 8, at 1265.
22. See SEC Rule, supra note 8, at 1265-66 (rule 3b-9 does not apply to banks involved
in networking arrangements or banks handling customer accounts through subsidiaries registered
as broker-dealers); see also supra note 18 (noting networking and subsidiary approaches for
banks wishing to do brokerage business).
23. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9 (1985) (requiring banks conducting brokerage business to
register as broker-dealers with SEC); see also supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (describing
basic regulatory scheme for persons registered as broker-dealers); note 14 and accompanying
text (noting examples of broker-dealer regulations which did not apply to banks doing brokerage
business prior to rule 3b-9).
24. See SEC Rule, supra note 8, at 1265-66 (banks handling customer accounts through
affiliates will sacrifice affiliates' share of brokerage commissions); see also ABA Sues SEC to
Block Commission Rule to Require Broker-Dealer Registration, [July-Dec.] SEC. REo. & L.
REP. (BNA) No. 32, at 1445 (Aug. 9, 1985) (rule 3b-9 discourages banks from handling
brokerage accounts internally and, consequently, deprives banks of brokerage income that banks
must share with affiliates).
25. See SEC Rule, supra note 8, at 1265-66 (bank subsidiary doing brokerage business
must register as broker-dealer with SEC); see also supra notes 4, 5, & 14 and accompanying
text (overview of regulatory scheme for persons registered as broker-dealers and examples of
broker-dealer regulations).
26. See American Bankers Ass'n (ABA) v. SEC, [July-Dec.] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
No. 43, at 1916 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 1985). In American Bankers, the National Council of Savings
Institutions (Savings Council) joined the ABA's suit against the SEC. See Savings Council Joins
Suit to Stop Bank Registration under SEC Rule 3b-9, [July-Dec.] SEC. REo. & L. REP. (BNA)
No. 41, at 1839. The Savings Council, a trade organization comprised of almost 600 savings
institutions, represented the interests of state and federally chartered savings banks. Savings
Council, supra, at 1839-40.
27. [July-Dec.] SEC. REG. & L. REp. (BNA) No. 43, at 1916.
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challenged the SEC's power to regulate banks.2" Noting that the '34 Act
specifically exempted banks from the broker-dealer registration requirement, 29 the ABA contended that Congress reserved the right to determine
whether to impose the registration requirement on banks. 0 The SEC contested the ABA's claim by citing the provision "unless the context otherwise
requires,"'" which qualifies the definition of the term "bank" in the '34
Act.3 2 The SEC argued that the "context" clause provided a statutory basis
for excluding banks engaged in brokerage activities from the definition of
33
"bank" and, consequently, from the bank registration exemption.
In considering whether the SEC had power to impose the broker-dealer
registration requirement on banks, the district court in American Bankers
stated that the meaning of the context clause qualifying the bank exemption
was unclear.3 The district court explained that the language of the context
clause was general and that the relevant legislative history did not indicate
Congress' intent in drafting the clause. 5 Noting section 3(b) of the '34 Act
which authorizes the SEC to define terms in administering the Act, 36 however,
the district court found that the SEC properly could narrow the bank
exemption by redefining the term "bank" as long as narrowing the exemption

28. See American Bankers, [July-Dec.] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 1916 (ABA
challenging SEC's power to regulate banks).
29. See American Bankers, [July-Dec.] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 1917 (ABA
noting bank exemption from '34 Act); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(4)-(5) (1982) (definitions of
"broker" and "dealer" excluding banks); supra note 8 (explanation of Congress' drafting
technique for exempting banks from '34 Act).
30. See American Bankers, [July-Dec.] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 1917. In
American Bankers, the ABA noted that in 1975, Congress, observing increased bank securities
activity, directed the SEC to conduct a study to determine whether the bank exemption from
the '34 Act and to report back the findings. Id.; see also STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING,
Housma AND URBAN AFFAms, 96TH CONG. IsT SEss. REPORT ON BANK SECUITIES AcTrInVTIs,
291-92 (Comm. Print 1977) (SEC recommended that limited bank securities activities in 1977
did not justify subjecting banks to federal securities regulations). The ABA argued that Congress'
directive to the SEC to "report back" demonstrates that Congress intended to reserve the
authority to impose SEC regulations on banks. American Bankers, [July-Dec.] SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 1917.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1982).
32. See American Bankers, [July-Dec.] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 1917
(indicating SEC's construction of context clause); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1985) (context clause
qualifies definitional section in '34 Act).
33. See American Bankers, [July-Dec.] SEC. RE. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 1917 (SEC
argument that recent proliferation of banks doing brokerage business is context requiring SEC
to regulate bank securities activities); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text (more than
1000 banks participate in brokerage activities); infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text
(explaining how SEC used context clause as statutory basis for adopting rule 3b-9).
34. American Bankers, [July-Dec.] SEC. REo. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 1917.
35. American Bankers, [July-Dec.] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 1917. But see
infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text (analysis of legislative history suggesting that context
clause did not authorize SEC to adopt rule 3b-9).
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (1982) (empowering SEC to define terms used in '34 Act).
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was rational and consistent with the purposes of the '34 Act. 37 Accordingly,
the district court deferred to the SEC's judgment and upheld rule 3b-9. as
Aside from American Bankers, authority relevant to the SEC's power to

require banks to register as broker-dealers is inconclusive. Congress' express
exemption of banks from the broker-dealer regulations of the '34 Act suggests
that the SEC acted beyond its power in adopting rule 3b-9. 39 Arguably, if
Congress had intended the SEC to regulate banks, Congress would not have
exempted banks from the broker-dealer registration requirement. 40 In enacting the '34 Act, however, Congress incorporated section 3(b) which authorizes
the SEC to define terms used in the '34 Act.4 ' In adopting rule 3b-9, the

SEC interpreted section 3(b) as authority to impose the broker-dealer registration requirement on banks by redefining the word 42"bank," a term that
Congress had defined in section 3(a)(6) of the '34 Act.

37. American Bankers, [July-Dec.] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 1917. In
American Bankers, the district court refused to consider policy arguments in its determination
of the SEC's authority to adopt rule 3b-9. Id. Instead, the district court deferred to the policy
determinations that the SEC made in adopting rule 3b-9. See id. (district court deferring to
SEC's policy judgment to adopt rule 3b-9); see also infra notes 43-64 and accompanying text
(discussing standard of judicial review for agency statutory interpretations).
38. See American Bankers, [July-Dec.] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 1917.
Although granting the SEC's summary judgment motion, the district court in American Bankers
noted that the merits of the case warranted expedited appeal. Id. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, however, subsequently rejected the ABA's bid
for expedited review. See American Bankers Ass'n v. SEC, in ABA Denied Expedited Review
of Appeal over SEC Bank Registration Rule 3b-9 [July-Dec.] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No.
46, at 2039 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 18, 1985).
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c (4)-(5) (1982) (definitions of "broker" and "dealer" specifically
excluding banks); see also C. SANDS, J. SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSRUCTION § 47.14, at 94
(4th ed. 1984) (suggesting that legislature's specific language typically should control general
language); 15 U.S.C. § 78c (context clause qualifies definition of "bank" in '34 Act); supra
note 8 and accompanying text (explaining how Congress exempted banks from broker-dealer
regulations of '34 Act by excluding banks from definitions of "broker" and "dealer"). Whether
a specific provision of a statute applies instead of a general qualifying provision is a matter of
judgment in each instance. See C. SANDS, supra, at 94. Allowing general qualifying language in
a statute to control a specific provision, however, creates the risk of giving a statute wider
operation than Congress intended. Id.
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c (4)-(5) (1982) (excluding banks from definitions of "broker" and
"dealer"); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text (explaining how Congress exempted
banks from broker-dealer regulations of '34 Act by excluding banks from definitions of
"broker" and "dealer"). Under casus omissus, a canon of statutory construction, if the
legislature did not address the disputed idea, the reader should not supply the idea. F. R.
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 236 (1975). Although casus
omissus seems to preclude an interpretation of the '34 Act that ignores Congress' specific
exemption of banks, the canon has become more of a political principle than a rule and, at
most, raises a mere presumption. Id.
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (1982) (authorizing SEC to define terms to effectuate purposes
of '34 Act); see also S. REP. No. 70, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 94 (1975) (Congress intended SEC
to have broad authority to define terms employed in '34 Act, whether or not already defined
in '34 Act).
42. See SEC Rule, supra note 8, at 1271 (noting SEC's reliance on section 78c(b) of '34
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Courts normally refuse to second-guess an administrative ruling when it
appears that the agency has interpreted the organic statute rationally. 43 For
example, the United States Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDCQ) emphasized the broad
discretion of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to interpret statutory language that Congress has left unclear. 4 In Chevron, the EPA
promulgated a regulation that permitted industrial plants containing several
pollution-emitting devices to install one additional pollution-emitting device
without obtaining additional building and operating permits. 46 In adopting
the regulation, the EPA relied upon the provision in the Clean Air Act that
authorizes the EPA to establish a permit program regulating "new or
4 7
modified major stationary sources.'

Act as authority to redefine Congress' definition of "bank"); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9
(1985) (requiring banks doing brokerage business to register as broker-dealers). Since the '34
Act requires all persons doing business as broker-dealers to register with the SEC, and since
Congress exempted banks from the broker-dealer registration requirement by excluding banks
from the definitions of "broker" and "dealer," rule 3b-9 imposes the broker-dealer registration
requirement on banks doing brokerage business by excluding banks doing brokerage business
from Congress' definition of "bank." See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1982) (requiring persons doing
business as brokers or dealers to register with SEC); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9 (1985)
(excluding banks doing brokerage business from definition of "bank"); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(4)-(5)
(1982) (excluding banks from definitions of "broker" and "dealer").
43. See, e.g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141 (1982) (interpretation by agency charged
with administering statute deserves substantial deference); Federal Election Comm. v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 42-43 (1981) (notwithstanding contrary
interpretation by court of appeals, Supreme Court deferred to Federal Election Commission's
interpretation that provision of Federal Election Campaign Act permitted particular campaign
contributions); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) (deferring to
National Labor Relations Board's interpretation that newsboys were "employees" under National Labor Relations Act); see also infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text (court may not
substitute its interpretation of ambiguous statute for reasonable interpretations of agency).
44. 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984).

45. See id. at 2781-83 (court may not substitute its interpretation of ambiguous statute
for reasonable interpretation of agency).
46. NRDC v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723-24 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. NRDC, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984); see also 40 C.F.R. § 51.18(j)(1)(i)-Cii) (1985) (Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulation relaxing permit requirement of Clean Air Act).
The Clean Air Act requires states that have not achieved national air quality standard, or
nonattainment states, to impose a permit program on industrial companies installing new or
modified pollution-emitting equipment. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1985). Under the Clean Air
Act, nonattainment states typically may not issue permits unless the companies meet stringent
air quality standards. See id. at § 7503 (prerequisites for obtaining equipment installation permit
in Clean Air Act).
47. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d at 720. In Chevron, the EPA relaxed the permit requirement by
defining "stationary source," at term that Congress had incorporated into the Clean Air Act.
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1985) (provision of Clean Air Act requiring permits for
construction or operation of "stationary sources"); 40 C.F.R. § 51.18(j)(1)(i)-(ii) (1985) (EPA's
definition of "stationary source"). In enacting the Clean Air Act, however, Congress had not
defined the word "stationary source." Gorsuch, 768 F.2d at 720-22; see also 42 U.S.C. §
7502(b)(6) (1985) (requiring permits for construction or operation of "stationary sources").
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Rejecting a petition by the NRDC to set aside the EPA's regulation, 4

the Supreme Court in Chevron stated that when Congress expresses itself
ambiguously or remains silent on an issue in drafting a statute, a reviewing
court should not substitute its interpretation of the statute for the agency's
interpretation unless the agency's interpretation clearly contradicts the purposes of the statute. 49 The Chevron Court determined that the EPA's

interpretation of the term "stationary source" as including pollution-emitting
equipment did not contradict the Clean Air Act.5 0 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court in Chevron upheld the EPA regulation that relaxed the permit requirement."'
Although concerned particularly with the EPA's power to adopt a rule
relaxing Congress' permit program, the Chevron decision reflects the prevailing view that courts owe a high degree of deference to an agency's
interpretation of a statute. 2 Thus, Chevron is support for judicial deference
to the SEC's interpretation of section 3(b) as authority to redefine Congress'
definition of "bank" in the '34 Act. 53 Under the analysis suggested by

48. See Chevron, 104 S.Ct. at 2778 (rejecting Natural Resources Defense Council's
(NRDC) petition to set aside EPA regulation that relaxed permit requirement). In Chevron, the
NRDC appealed the EPA's order to implement the EPA regulation to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Gorsuch, 768 F.2d at 719-20. The NRDC
noted that Congress intended the permit program of the Clean Air Act to improve existing air
quality. Gorsuch, 768 F.2d at 719-20. The NRDC argued that the EPA's interpretation of
"stationary source" to relax the permit requirement was contrary to Congress' intent and,
therefore, was invalid. Gorsuch, 768 F.2d at 719-20.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court determined that the Clean Air Act did not indicate
what Congress had perceived as "stationary source," that the legislative history did not address
the issue, and that only the purposes of the permit program suggested Congress' intended
meaning of "stationary sources." Id. at 725-28. The District of Columbia Circuit concluded
that the EPA's interpretation of "stationary sources," which relaxed the requirements of the
permit program, was inconsistent with Congress' purpose to improve air quality in nonattainment
states. Id. Accordingly, the District of Columbia Circuit invalidated the EPA's regulation. Id.
49. Chevron, 104 S.Ct. at 2778. The United States Supreme Court in Chevron reasoned
that by leaving gaps in regulatory statutes, Congress explicitly or implicitly vests authority in
agencies to interpret the statutes in adopting specific rules. Id. at 2782. The Court stated that
agencies administering statutes necessarily face policy decisions in filling gaps that Congress has
left in the statutes. Id. The Court noted that agencies, unlike federal courts, must answer to
constituencies. Id. at 2793. The Chevron Court concluded that when an agency, in interpreting
a statute, has made a reasonable policy choice, federal judges must respect the agency's
interpretation. Id. at 2793-94.
50. Id. at 2793-94. The Chevron Court determined that Congress intended the permit
program to reconcile the policy of air quality improvement with the policy of economic growth.
Id. at 2792-94. Finding that the EPA's regulation relaxing the permit program encouraged economic
growth without threatening air quality, the Supreme Court upheld the regulation. Id.
51. Id. at 2781.
52. See id. at 2782 (court may not substitute its interpretation of ambiguous statute for
reasonable interpretation of agency); see also supra note 43 (examples of Supreme Court
deferring to statutory interpretations of various administrative agencies).
53. See Chevron, 104 S.Ct. at 2782 (court may not substitute its interpretation of
ambiguous statute for reasonable interpretation of agency); see also SEC v. Paro, 468 F. Supp.
635, 643 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (deferring to SEC's interpretation of "investment contract" because
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Chevron, the only question for the judiciary is whether the SEC's interpre-

tation of section 3(b) was reasonable. 4
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in FAIC Securities, Inc. v. United States" implies that the
SEC's interpretation of section 3(b) as authority to redefine Congress'
definition of "bank" was not reasonable. 6 In FAIC Securities, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) promulgated a regulation that re5 7
duced the existing insurance coverage on funds deposited by deposit brokers.

In adopting the regulation, the FDIC interpreted a provision in the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act (FDIAY8 as authority to redefine "amount due to
any depositor," 5 9 a term that Congress had defined in the FDIA.W6 In
considering whether the FDIC had authority to reduce the insurance coverage, 6' the District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged the legitimacy of the

SEC's interpretation did not contradict language, purpose, or history of '34 Act); Lockheed
Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282, 284 (S.D. Cal. 1953) (upholding SEC's definition
of word "officer," used but not defined in '34 Act, as valid exercise of SEC's power under
section 78c(b) to define terms). But cf.SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1978) (rejecting as
illogical SEC's interpretation of section 12(k) of '34 Act to roll over suspension orders).
54. See Chevron, 104 S.Ct. at 2782 (only question for court reviewing agency's interpretation is whether agency's interpretation was reasonable).
55. 768 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
56. See id. at 362 (in administering Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) may not redefine terms that Congress already had defined in FDIA).
57. FAIC Sec., Inc. v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 73, 75 (D.D.C. 1984); see also 12
C.F.R. § 330.13(b) (1985) (rule to reduce insurance coverage on funds deposited by deposit
brokers). Deposit brokers bring together individual depositors and place funds of the separate
depositors in banks that pay high interest rates on brokers' deposits. FAIC Sec., 595 F. Supp.
at 76. For a commission, deposit brokers make deposits of customer funds that draw interest
and receive federal deposit insurance protection up to $100,000. Ird.
58. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 264, 1728, 1811-1832 (1982).
59. Id. at § 1813(m).
60. FAIC Sec., 595 F. Supp. at 76-77; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m)(1) (defining "amount
due to any depositor" as an amount up to $100,000); 12 C.F.R. § 330.13(b) (1985) (FDIC rule
to reduce insurance coverage on funds deposited by deposit brokers).
61. See FAIC Sec., 768 F.2d at 362 (District of Columbia Circuit considering whether
FDIC had power to reduce insurance coverage on brokered deposits). In FAIC Securities, FAIC
Securities and the Securities Industry Association (SIA) challenged the FDIC's authority to
reduce deposit broker insurance coverage. See FAIC Sec. 595 F. Supp. at 73 (FAIC and SIA
suing to set aside FDIC rule); see also 12 C.F.R. § 330.13(b) (1985) (FDIC rule to reduce
insurance coverage on funds deposited by deposit brokers). FAIC Securities is a private firm
engaged in the deposit brokerage business. FAIC Sec., 595 F. Supp. at 75. The SIA is a trade
association of deposit brokers. Id. FAIC and the SIA also sued the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB) which had adopted a rule similar to the FDIC rule. Id. at 73 (FAIC and SIA
suing FHLBB); see also 12 C.F.R. § 564.12(b) (1985) (FHLBB rule to reduce insurance coverage
on funds deposited by deposit brokers).
Contesting the claim of FAIC Securities and the SIA, the FDIC and the FHLBB cited a
1966 amendment to the FDIA as authority to define terms to clarify the insurance coverage
under the FDIA and the National Housing Act (NHA). FAIC Sec., 595 F. Supp. at 78; see
also Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 91-151, 83 Stat. 375 (1966),
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general provision authorizing the FDIC to define terms in administering the
FDIA. 62 The FAIC Securities court determined, however, that the provision
authorizing the FDIC to define terms did not authorize the FDIC to redefine
terms that Congress already had defined in drafting the FDIA. 63 Concluding
that the FDIC, therefore, had exceeded its power by reducing insurance
coverage for deposit brokers, the FAIC Securities court enjoined the FDIC
from implementing the regulation."
FAIC Securities suggests that section 3(b) of the '34 Act, which authorizes the SEC to define terms, did not authorize the SEC to redefine Congress'
definition of the term "bank. ' 65 In passing the '34 Act, Congress defined
the term "bank" in section 3(a)(6) as national banks, Federal Reserve
member banks, or state banks resembling national banks.6 Congress' definition of the term "bank" does not distinguish banks based on the extent
of a bank's involvement in the securities market. 67 Congress' definition of
"bank," therefore, includes even banks doing brokerage business. 6 Importantly, when Congress has defined a term clearly, FAIC Securities is consisamending 12 U.S.C. §§ 1728(a), 1813(m) (1982) (authorizing FHLBB and FDIC to define terms
under NHA and FDIA, respectively).
In considering the FDIC's authority to reduce deposit broker insurance coverage, the
district court in FAIC Securities determined that Congress had intended the FDIA to guarantee
each depositor insurance up to the statutory limits regardless of who deposited the funds in the
bank. FAIC Sec., 595 F. Supp. at 77-78. The district court further determined that the FDIC's
authority to define terms was not authority to alter a depositor's right to the insurance protection
guaranteed by the FDIA. Id. at 79. Determining that the FDIC's regulation was inconsistent
with the provisions of the FDIA, the district court set aside the rule. Id.
62. See FAIC Sec., 768 F.2d at 362 (District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged FDIC's
power to define terms); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m)(1) (1982) (FDIC has authority to define
terms to clarify insurance coverage provisions).
63. FAIC Sec., 768 F.2d at 362. In FAIC Securities, the District of Columbia Circuit
determined that the FDIC had redefined "amount due to any depositor" in adopting the rule
reducing the insurance coverage of deposits executed by deposit brokers. Id. at 362-64; see 12
U.S.C. § 1813(m)(1) (1982) (Congress' definition of "amount due to any depositor" as an
amount up to $100,000); see 12 C.F.R. § 330.13(b) (1985) (FDIC rule reducing insurance
coverage). The FAIC Securities court observed that Congress already had defined "amount due
to any depositor" as equalling up to $100,000 on the aggregate deposit of each beneficial
owner. FAIC Sec., 758 F.2d at 361; see 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m)(1) (1982) (Congress' definition of
"amount due to any depositor"). Accordingly, the District of Columbia Circuit in FAIC
Securities determined that the FDIC exceeded its authority in adopting a rule that would spread
a single sum of $100,000 over all deposits placed in a bank by a single deposit broker, because
the rule would not guarantee each beneficial owner up to $100,000 of coverage as Congress had
provided. FAIC Sec., 768 F.2d at 362.
64. FAIC Sec., 768 F.2d at 362-64.
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(6) (1982) (Congress defined "bank" in '34 Act as national
banks, Federal Reserve member banks, or state banks similar to national banks).
66. See ABA Sues SEC to Block Commission Rule to RequireBroker-DealerRegistration,
[July-Dec.] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 32, at 1445 (Aug. 9, 1985) (bank exemption from
broker-dealer registration requirement of '34 Act is absolute); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(6)
(1982) (definition of "bank" in '34 Act).
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(6) (1982) ('34 Act definition of "bank" which makes no
reference to brokerage activities).
68. See FAIC Sec., 768 F.2d at 362 (FDIC could not redefine terms of FDIA that
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tent with Chevron, which applies only when a statute is ambiguous or incomplete.69
Although section 3(b) of the '34 Act arguably did not authorize the SEC
to redefine Congress' unambiguous definition of "bank," Congress prefaced
the definition of "bank" in the '34 Act with the clause "unless the context
otherwise requires. ' 70 Since Congress promulgated the '34 Act, courts and
commentators have disagreed over the proper construction of the "context"
clause . 7 Some authority equates the word "context" with the factual setting
of a situation and, consequently, the definitions of terms subject to the
context clause may change as the facts seem to require. 72 Other authority
equates the word "context" with the various textual provisions throughout
the '34 Act so that the definitions of terms prefaced by the context clause
remain constant unless other provisions of the '34 Act require a different
meaning.73 Therefore, under the factual context approach, the proliferation
of bank securities activities without sufficient regulation arguably constituted
a factual context requiring the SEC to modify Congress' specific definition
of "bank. ' 74 In contrast, textual construction of the context clause would
preclude the SEC from changing Congress' definition of "bank," despite
7
changes in the banking industry.
The legislative history relevant to the proper construction of the context
clause supports textual construction of the clause.7 6 The context clause
originated in a House bill that Congress ultimately enacted as the Securities

Congress already had defined); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(aX6) (1982) (Congress defined "bank"
as national banks, Federal Reserve member banks, or state banks similar to national banks);
17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9 (1985) (rule 3b-9 excluding banks doing brokerage business from definition
of "bank").
69. Chevron, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82 (court may not substitute its interpretation of ambiguous
statute for reasonable interpretation by agency); see also FAIC Sec., 768 F.2d at 362 (FDIC
could not redefine terms of FDIA that Congress already had defined).
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1982) (context clause which prefaces definitional section of '34
Act).
71. See infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text (authorities construing context clause as
applicable only when '34 Act definitions are inconsistent with particular provisions of '34 Act);
notes 95-106 and accompanying text (courts that have construed context clause as contemplating
underlying factual transaction of case).
72. See infra notes 95-106 and accompanying text (courts construing "context" clause as
applicable only when '34 Act definitions are inconsistent with particular provisions of '34 Act).
73. See infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text (authorities construing context clause as
applicable only when '34 Act definitions are inconsistent with particular provisions of '34 Act).
74. See SEC Rule, supra note 8, at 1269 (in adopting rule 3b-9, SEC determined that
"context" of context clause referred to factual scenario of unregulated bank securities activities);
see also infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text (analysis of propriety of SEC's factual
context approach to context clause).
75. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (analysis demonstrating that textual
construction of context clause would preclude SEC from applying clause to exclude banks doing
brokerage business from '34 Act definition of "bank").
76. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (analysis of legislative history supporting
textual construction of context clause).
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Act of 1933 ('33 Act). 77 After the House passed the bill prefacing a list of
definitions with the context clause,78 the Senate amended the bill and without
comment replaced the context clause with "unless the text otherwise indicates." 7 9 In reconciling the House and Senate versions of the '33 Act, the
conference committee discussed several material differences, but mentioned
no distinction between the "text" language of the Senate version and the
context clause of the House version. 0 The committee chose the House
version of the '33 Act containing the context clause."' The following year,
Congress again used the context clause to preface the list of definitions in
82
the '34 Act,
The failure of the conference committee to distinguish the term "text"
from the term "context" in the '33 Act suggests that Congress perceived the
Senate's "text" language and the context clause as interchangeable. 3 Ac-

77. See H.R, 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess, (1933), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
1933, at Item 24 (1973) ('33 Act bill prefacing definitions with context clause).
78. See H.R, 5480, 73d Cong,, 1st Sess. (1933), reprintedin '33 ACT HISTORY, supra note
77, at Item 24 (House passing bill that prefaced definitions with context clause),
79. See H.R, 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess, (1933), reprintedin '33 ACT HISTORY, supra note
77, at Item 27 (Senate revisions of House bill). The provision "unless the text otherwise
indicates" appeared in several bills that Congress considered in passing the '33 Act. In addition
to the Senate version containing "unless the text otherwise indicates," the first House bill
sponsored for the '33 Act prefaced the defined words with the "text" language, See H.R. 4314,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), reprintedin '33 ACT HISTORY, supra note 77, at Item 22, Moreover,
the "text" language of the first House bill was identical to a clause prefacing the definitions of
a Senate bill introduced on the same day. See S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess, (1933), reprinted in
'33 ACT HISTORY, supra note 77, at item 28.
80. See H,R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1933), reprinted in '33 ACT
HISTORY, supra note 77, at Item 19 (conference committee comparing House version of bill to
Senate version).
SECumrTIEs ACT,

81. Id.
82, See H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1934), reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 6, at Items 31 & 32 (passage of '34 Act in House and Senate with "context" clause
prefacing definitions).
83. Ruefenacht v, O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 331 (3d Cir. 1984); see also H.R. REP. No.
152, 73d Cong,, Ist Sess. 24-25 (1933), reprinted in '33 ACT HISTORY, supra note 77 at Item 19
(conference committee comparing House version of bill to Senate version), The Third Circuit
in Ruefenacht v, O'Hallorannoted the material distinction between textual and factual construction of the context clause and determined that the drafters of the '33 and '34 Acts viewed
"text" and "context" as interchangeable. Ruefenacht, 737 F.2d at 331. The Ruefenacht court
determined that factual construction of the context clause would vest in the SEC a broadranging exemption power. Id. Pointing to section 78 of the '34 Act, which specifically confers
a narrow exemption power on the SEC, the Ruefenacht court argued that Congress did not
intend the context clause to ineffectuate the SEC's narrow exemption power. Id.
In concluding that Congress intended textual construction of the context clause, the Third
Circuit in Ruefenacht erroneously stated that in amending the '33 Act bill, the Senate borrowed
the "text" language from the first House bill and that the conference committee authored the
context clause. Id. at 330. In fact, though, the "text" language tracked a Senate bill introduced
on the same day as the first House bill, and the conference committee merely ratified the
context clause. See S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess, (1933), reprinted in '33 ACT HISTORY, supra
note 77, at Item 28 (Senate bill introduced on March 29, 1933 prefacing definitions with "unless
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cordingly, Congress probably intended textual construction of the context
clause in the '33 Act because the Senate version of the '33 Act, which
incorporated the "text" language, precluded factual situations from preempting Congress' specific definitions.84 Likewise, Congress probably intended
textual construction of the context clause in the '34 Act since Congress,
without comment, prefaced the definitions of the '34 Act with the identical
clauseY
In addition to the legislative history, the prevailing conventions of

statutory construction when Congress passed the '33 and '34 Acts suggest
that Congress intended textual construction of the context clause. s6 When
Congress passed the '33 and '34 Acts, the context clause simply reflected a

canon of construction that courts otherwise implied as a license to adjust
definitions as needed to make statutes internally consistent. 7 Significantly,

the text otherwise indicates"); see also H.R. 4314, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), reprintedin "33
ACT HISTORY, supra note 77, at Item 22 (initial House bill for '33 Act introduced on March
29, 1933, prefacing definitions with "unless the text otherwise indicates"); H.R. 5480, 73d
Cong., IstSess. (1933), reprinted in '33 ACT HISTORY, supra note 77, at Item 24 (House bill
prefacing definitions with context clause).
Although incorrectly stating the legislative history, the Third Circuit, nonetheless, espoused
a persuasive theory of Congress' intent in drafting the context clause by pointing out that the
drafters added and deleted the two definitional prefaces in each instance without comment. See
Ruefenacht, 737 F.2d at 330-32; see also supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (Senate and
House revisions of bills for '33 Act). In addition, the Third Circuit persuasively argued that
Congress did not intend the context clause to ineffectuate section 78 which conferred on the
SEC a narrow exemption power. See Ruefenacht, 737 F.2d at 331.
84. Ruefenacht, 737 F.2d at 331; see also H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1933),
reprintedin '33 ACT HISTORY, supra note 77, at Item 27 (Senate enactment of House bill with
"unless the text otherwise indicates" prefacing definitions); infra notes 86-89 and accompanying
text (textual construction of context clause precludes changing definitions unless other provisions
of text require a different meaning). The conference committee's selection of the House version
of the '33 Act bill incorporating the context clause rather than the Senate version iccorporating
the "text" language could support an inference that Congress rejected textual construction of
the context clause. This argument would be circular, however, because it assumes that Congress
intended the word "context" to mean the factual setting.
85. Ruefenacht, 737 F.2d at 331; see also H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1934), reprinted
in 10 LEGISLAT E HISTORY, supra note 6, at Items 31 & 32 (passage of '34 Act in House and
Senate with context clause prefacing definitions).
86. See Hammett, Any PromissoryNote: The Obscene Security A Search for the NonCommercial Investment, 7 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 25, 39-40 (1975) (context clause is congressionally mandated rule of construction to determine meaning of term in context of statute). When
Congress passed the '34 Act, section 1 of the Revised Statutes stated that determining the
meaning of any act or resolution of Congress requires singular words sometimes to extend and
apply to several persons or things unless the context shows that Congress intended those words
to have a more limited meaning. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431. The context clause
of the Revised Statutes undoubtedly refers to the text of the Statutes. See Hammett, supra, at
39-40. Congress intended the terms of its future laws to apply to facts, not to permit facts to
define terms. See id. Conceivably, the drafters of the '33 Act borrowed the rule of construction
that Congress had articulated in prefacing the Revised Statutes. See id.
87. See 4 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 2485 (2d ed. Supp. 1969) (context clause is rule
of statutory construction that Congress provided to help courts make statutes internally
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the '33 and '34 Acts contain provisions giving words meanings that differ
from the specific definitions of the same words prefaced by the context
clause.ss Therefore, the context clause arguably represents Congress' foresightful effort to help courts resolve inconsistencies among the various
provisions in the '34 Act. 9
After Congress enacted the '34 Act, the United States Supreme Court in
SEC v. National Securities, Inc. 9 construed the context clause in determining
whether an alleged fraud involved a "purchase or sale" of securities within
the meaning of section 10(b) of the '34 Act. 9' Like the term "bank," the
terms "purchase" and "sale" belong to the list of defined terms prefaced
by the context clause in the '34 Act. 92 Rejecting the argument that "purchase"
and "sale" have the same meaning in section 10(b) of the '34 Act as in

section 5 of the '33 Act, the Supreme Court in National Securities stated
that Congress prefaced the definitions with the context clause to caution that
the same words may have different meanings in different provisions of the

consistent); see, e.g., Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)
(not unusual for same word to have different meaning in same act, and courts should apply
appropriate meaning in each case); Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916) (in construing
the term "officer," Court noted that same words may have different meanings in different
parts of same act); American Sec. & Trust Co. v. Comm'rs. of the District of Columbia, 224
U.S. 491, 494 (1912) (same phrase may have different meanings in different connections).
88. See Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 269 (7th Cir. 1967) (determining that
merger was "sale" as defined in '34 Act for purposes of section 10(b), although not for
purposes of registration requirement); Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F.2d 875,
878 (2d Cir. 1943) (determining that context clause in '33 Act required "sell" as defined in
section 2 to have narrower meaning in section 5 than in section 12); Loss, supra note 87, at
214-15 (in '33 Act, "context" of section 2 requires giving "underwriter" narrower meaning in
section 2(3) than in section 2(11)).
89. See Hannan, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Securities,
25 HAsTniGs L. J. 219, 277-79 (1974) (discussing context clause as statutory basis for giving
same terms different meanings in different parts of '34 Act); Sonnenschein, Federal Securities
Law Coverage of Note Transactions:The AntifraudProvisions, 35 Bus. LAW. 1567, 1577 (1980)
(Congress intended context clause to refer to text of '33 and '34 Acts).
90. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
91. See id. at 466. In SEC v. National Securities, Inc., the SEC sued National Securities,
Inc. (National Securities) in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, claiming
that National Securities had misrepresented facts to its shareholders in violation of section 10(b)
of the '34 Act. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 623, 624 (D. Ariz. 1966). The district
court granted summary judgment for National Securities, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 626; see also SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 387
F.2d 25, 32 (9th Cir. 1967). On the SEC's appeal to the Supreme Court, National Securities
argued that the Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit's decision because the alleged misrepresentations had not involved a "purchase or sale" as defined in the '34 Act. National Sec., 393
U.S. at 464; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13)-(14) (1982) (definitions of "purchase" and "sale"
in '34 Act). National Securities argued that section 10(b) of the '34 Act, therefore, did not
apply because a purchase or sale was a prerequisite to the applicability of section 10(b). National
Sec., 393 U.S. at 464; see also Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1982) (prohibiting fraud perpetuated in connection with purchase or sale of securities).
92. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13)-(14) (1982) ('34 Act definitions of "purchase" and "sale"
prefaced by context clause).
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securities laws. 93 Thus, the Supreme Court in National Securities adopted
textual construction of the context clause in accordance with Congress'
probable intent in drafting the clause.9
Despite the Supreme Court's textual context approach to the context
clause in National Securities, many federal courts applying the clause since
National Securities have construed the clause factually. 9 These courts typically have construed the context clause in determining the meaning of
"security" under the '33 and '34 Acts. 96 Like the term "bank," the term
"security" is contained in the definitional section prefaced by the context
clause in the '34 Act. 97 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
98
Circuit in Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co.
typifies the federal courts that have construed the context clause factually. 99

93. National See., 393 U.S. at 466. In National Securities, National Securities noted that
a merger was not a "sale" under section 5 of the '33 Act. Id. at 465-66; see also 17 C.F.R. §
230.133(a) (1985) (statutory merger is not "sale" as defined in '33 Act). National Securities
argued that, similarly, a merger was not a "purchase" or "sale" under section 10(b) of the '34
Act. National Sec., 393 U.S. at 466; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13)-(14) (definitions of
"purchase" and "sale" in '34 Act including mergers).
94. See National Sec., 393 U.S. at 466 (Congress prefaced definitions in '33 and '34 Acts
with context clause because same words may have different meanings in different parts of
statutes); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1982) (context clause prefacing definitions in '34 Act);
supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text (analysis of legislative history suggesting that Congress
intended textual construction of context clause); notes 86-89 and accompanying text (discussion
of usage in statutory construction when Congress passed '34 Act evidencing that Congress intended textual construction of context clause).
95. See, e.g., Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A., 739 F.2d 1458, 1460-63 (9th Cir.)
(determining that adequacy of regulation was factual context requiring exclusion of certificate
of deposit issued for pesos by Mexican bank from definition of "security" in '33 Act), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 784 (1984); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1981)
(rejecting textual context approach to context clause and applying context clause to limit
definition of security), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1982); infra notes 96-106 and accompanying
text (federal courts construing context clause factually).
The factual context approach apparently originated in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri. See Hammett, supra note 86, at 38; see also Joseph v.
Norman's Health Club, 336 F. Supp. 307, 313 (E.D. Mo. 1971). In Joseph v. Norman's Health
Club, the plaintiffs bought lifetime memberships in the defendant's health club. 336 F. Supp.
at 310. The plaintiffs paid for the membership with promissory notes. Id. at 312. Upon learning
that the defendant had discounted the notes, the plaintiffs sued the defendant under the
antifraud provisions of the '34 Act. Id. The district court in Joseph found that Congress'
specific definition of "security" potentially comprehended the promissory notes. Id. at 313.
The Joseph court noted, however, that the context clause prefaced the definition of "security"
in the '34 Act. Id. In construing the context clause, the district court in Joseph determined that
exchanging promissory notes for membership in a club was a factual context making Congress'
specific definition of "security" inapplicable. Id. Accordingly, the Joseph court dismissed the
plaintiff's claim under the '34 Act because the transaction did not involve a security. Id.
96. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (examples of federal courts construing
context clause factually in determining meaning of "security" under '34 Act).
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982) ('34 Act definition of "security" prefaced by context
clause).
98. 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
99. See Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137
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In Exchange National, the brokerage firm of Weis, Voisin & Co. (Weis)
sold three unsecured, subordinated notes to the Exchange National Bank of
Chicago (Exchange National) for one million dollars"0 Weis eventually went
bankrupt, and the notes became worthless.' 0' Exchange National sued the
accounting firm of Touche Ross & Co. (Touche Ross), claiming that Touche
Ross had violated the '34 Act by reporting misleading information about
Weis' financial condition which had induced Exchange National to buy the

notes. 0 2 In determining whether the '34 Act applied to the transaction, 03 the
Second Circuit in Exchange National considered whether the definition of
"security" under the '34 Act comprehended the unsecured, subordinated
notes that Exchange National bought from Weis.' °4 The Second Circuit
cautioned that the context clause could exempt the notes from the specific
definition of "security" under a variety of factual circumstances, but determined, nonetheless, that the definition of "security" included the three notes
in question. 05 Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that the '34 Act applied
to the unsecured, subordinated notes. ' 6
The federal courts that have construed the context clause factually have
not reconciled their factual context approach with the textual context approach of the Supreme Court in National Securities.0 7 Moreover, those
federal courts, in construing the context clause, have failed to address the
congressional record which tends to support textual construction of the
clause. 08 The inability or unwillingness of the federal courts to justify their
departure from the textual context approach would cast doubt on the SEC's

(2d Cir. 1976); see also supra note 95 and accompanying text (federal courts' factual context
approach to context clause).
100. See Touche Ross, 544 F.2d at 1128 (transaction in Touche Ross).
101. See id. (brokerage firm of Weis, Voisin & Co. (Weis) went bankrupt).
102. See id. In Touche Ross, Exchange National, in determining whether to buy three
notes from Weis, obtained accounting reports from Touche Ross & Co. (Touche Ross). See id.
The reports did not reflect that the bankruptcy court had placed Weis in receivership. See id.
Thus, upon discovering that the notes were worthless, Exchange National held Touche Ross
responsible. See id.
103. See Touche Ross, 544 F.2d at 1128-36 (district court denied Touche Ross' motion to
dismiss, and Touche Ross appealed to United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit).
104. Id. at 1131-38; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982) ('34 Act definition of "security").
105. Touche Ross, 544 F.2d at 1137-39; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982) ('34 Act
definition of "security" prefaced by context clause). The Second Circuit in Touche Ross cited
examples of factual contexts that would narrow the '34 Act's definition of "security" to include
most note transactions. See Touche Ross, 544 F.2d at 1134-36 ('34 Act's definition of "security"
not applicable when consumer delivers note in financing arrangement, when note evidences
character loan to bank customer, or when small businessman delivers note against lien on
business assets).
106. Touche Ross, 544 F.2d at 1137-39.
107. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (Supreme Court's textual construction
of context clause in NationalSecurities); see also notes 95-106 and accompanying text (federal
courts' factual context approach to context clause).
108. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text (legislative history of '33 and '34 Acts
suggesting that Congress intended textual construction of context clause); see also supra notes
95-106 and accompanying text (federal courts' factual context approach to context clause).
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factual construction of the context clause and, consequently, on the SEC's
authority to adopt rule 3b-9.109 The United States Supreme Court, however,
recently may have construed the context clause factually in determining
whether FDIC-insured certificates of deposit were "securit[ies]" as defined
in the '34 Act."10
In Marine Bank v. Weaver,' Sam and Alice Weaver sued Marine Bank
on the grounds that Marine Bank fraudulently sold them an FDIC-insured
certificate of deposit in violation of the antifraud provisions of the '34
Act."12 In considering whether the certificate of deposit was a "security" as
defined in the '34 Act," 3 the Supreme Court in Marine Bank observed the
broad definition of "security" in the Act and noted a preference to construe
"security" broadly to further the investor protection purpose of the Act." 4
The Court noted, however, that the context clause qualified the broad
definition of "security."'5 In considering the effect of the context clause on
the definition of "security," the Court observed that the comprehensive
regulatory scheme governing the banking industry already protected persons

109, See supra notes 76-94 and accompanying text (analysis suggesting propriety of textual
context approach to context clause); see also supra notes 76-94 and accompanying text (analysis
demonstrating that textual construction of context clause makes '34 Act's definition of "bank"
applicable unless preempted by specific provision of '34 Act).
110. See Marine Bank v,Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555-59 (1982) (applying context clause to
determine whether FDIC-insured certificate of deposit was a security under '34 Act).

I1l. Id.
112, Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78; (antifraud provisions of '34 Act generally applicable to
securities transactions, including transactions executed by banks). In Marine Bank v. Weaver,
Sam and Alice Weaver bought a $50,000 FDIC-insured certificate of deposit (CD) from Marine
Bank, the Weavers pledged the CD to guarantee a $65,000 loan that Marine Bank had made to
Columbus Packing Co., a slaughter house and meat market business that already owed Marine
Bank $33,000. Id By guaranteeing the $65,000 loan, the Weavers became entitled to 50% of
Columbus' net profit plus $100 per month and additional consideration. Id. When the Weavers
discovered that Columbus had filed for bankruptcy and that Marine Bank, thus, had become
entitled to the Weavers' $50,000 CD, the Weavers claimed that bank officers of Marine Bank
fraudulently had solicited the Weavers to guarantee the $65,000 loan. Id. The district court
determined that the transaction did not involve the purchase or sale of a security as defined in
the '34 Act. Id. Concluding that the '34 Act, therefore, did not apply, the District Court
granted summary judgment for Marine Bank. Id.
The Third Circuit in Marine Bank determined that the FDIC-insured CD was functionally
equal to the withdrawable capital shares of a savings and loan association. Weaver v. Marine
Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 1980). The Third Circuit determined, therefore, that the CD
was a security under the '34 Act because the Supreme Court earlier had held that withdrawable
capital shares were securities under the '34 Act. Id.; see Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,
345-46 (1967) (withdrawable capital shares of savings and loan association are securities under
'34 Act).
113, See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S, at 552 (considering whether FDIC-insured CD
was "security" under '34 Act).
114. See id. at 555-56 (definition of "security" under '34 Act includes unusual and irregular
instruments); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text (Congress promulgated '34 Act to
protect investors from unfair practices in securities Market),
115. See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 556 (context clause qualified definition of "security");
see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c (context clause qualifying definitions of '34 Act).
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investing in FDIC-insured certificates of deposit." 6 The Marine Bank Court
reasoned, therefore, that extending the '34 Act's protection to the Weavers

was unnecessary, even though the broad definition of "security" ordinarily
would comprehend certificates of deposit." 7 Accordingly, the Supreme Court

in Marine Bank dismissed the Weavers' claim under section 10(b) of the '34
Act. 1

8

The Marine Bank Court may have construed the context clause factually
by equating the word "context" with the existing regulatory scheme for the

banking and securities industries.' 9 The Court based its holding, however,
on the independent ground that SEC regulation of the Weaver's certificates
of deposit was inconsistent with the legislative history of federal banking
and securities laws. 20 Therefore, the Court's references to the context clause
arguably were dicta.' 2' Moreover, the Marine Bank Court expressed no

intention to depart from the textual approach that the Supreme Court in
NationalSecurities v. SEC had endorsed unequivocally.' 2 Finally, prudential
considerations militate against imputing to the Marine Bank Court a position
inconsistent with Congress' probable intent in incorporating the context
clause. 2 3 Consequently, whether the Marine Bank Court sanctioned factual
construction of the context clause is unclear. 24 Thus, the proper construction
25
of the context clause is unsettled.

116. See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 558-59. In MarineBank, the Supreme Court noted the
reporting, advertising, and inspection requirements that the federal banking regulators imposed
on banks to assure the financial safety of banks. Id. The Court determined that regulation to
assure financial safety coupled with FDIC protection of customer deposits adequately protected
the Weavers in their purchase of an FDIC-insured CD. Id. But cf. supra note 14 and
accompanying text (banking regulation inadequate to protect investors in securities).
117. See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 559 (applying context clause to preempt specific
definition of "security" in '34 Act); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (definition of "security"
qualified by context clause).
118. See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 559 (Marine Bank Court reversed Third Circuit's
decision).
119. See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 559 (adequacy of federal banking regulations to cover
FDIC-insured CDs was a context that made definition of security inapplicable).
120. See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 559 (applying '34 Act to FDIC-insured CDs would be
inconsistent with legislative history of federal banking and securities laws).
121. See id., 560 n. I (articulating decisional basis independent of context clause).
122. See id. (articulating decisional basis independent of context clause); see also SEC v.
National Sec., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969) (Congress prefaced definitions in '33 and '34 Acts with
context clause because same words may have different meanings in different parts of statute).
123. See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 559 (articulating decisional basis independent of context
clause); see also supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text (legislative history suggesting that
Congress intended textual construction of context clause).
124. See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text (analysis demonstrating that whether
Marine Bank Court adopted factual context approach to context clause is unclear).
125. See supra notes 76-94 and accompanying text (legislative history and National Securities favor textual construction of context clause); notes 95 & 124 and accompanying text
(federal courts have construed context clause factually, and whether MarineBank Court adopted
factual context approach to context clause is unclear).
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Significantly, though, Marine Bank created a legitimate basis for the

SEC's factual construction of the context clause. 26 Indeed, several federal
courts have cited Marine Bank as the Supreme Court's approval of the
factual context approach to the context clause.

27

The Supreme Court's

decision in Chevron, therefore, suggests that the judiciary should defer to
28

the SEC's reasonable construction of the context clause.
Authorized by Marine Bank to look outside the text of the '34 Act to

interpret the context clause, the SEC in adopting rule 3b-9 equated the word
"context" with the adequacy of existing regulation to preserve the investor
protection function of the '34 Act.

29

Thus, in adopting rule 3b-9, the SEC

determined that the proliferation of banks engaged in unregulated securities
activities was a factual context that required SEC protection of investors
trading securities through banks. 30 Opponents of rule 3b-9, however, maintain that the Marine Bank Court interpreted the context clause narrowly to

restrict the SEC's jurisdiction and, thus, to prevent overlapping in the jurisdictions of the federal regulatory agencies."'' The opponents of rule 3b-9
argue that the word "context" in the context clause simply requires the SEC

to abstain from regulating industries that are already subject to regulation
32

by other agencies.
The Supreme Court's opinion in MarineBank, however, requires analysis
beyond the simple inquiry whether SEC regulation of banks would create
multiple regulation of the banking industry. 3 In interpreting the context
clause, the Marine Bank Court tempered its discussion of dual regulation by
addressing the adequacy of federal banking regulations to protect persons
investing in FDIC-insured certificates of deposit. 3 4 Thus, in Marine Bank,
the relevant "context" was the adequacy or inadequacy of federal banking

126. See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 556-59 (citing context clause in determining whether
FDIC-insured CDs were securities).
127. See, e.g., Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A., 739 F.2d 1458, 1462 (9th Cir.
1984) (Marine Bank Court construed context clause factually); Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496,
500 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Marine Bank as support for factual construction of context clause);
Crownair Systems, Inc. v. Wolf, 598 F. Supp. 1478, 1480-81 (D. Puerto Rico 1984) (citing
Marine Bank as authority to construe context clause factually).
128. See Chevron, 104 S.Ct. at 2782 (court may not substitute its interpretation of
ambiguous statute for reasonable interpretation of agency); see also supra notes 44-54 and
accompanying text (analysis of judicial review of agency interpretations of statutes).
129. See SEC Rule, supra note 8, at 1269-70 (SEC's determination that proliferation of
unregulated bank securities activities was context requiring implementation of rule 3b-9).
130. Id.
131. See American Bankers Ass'n v. SEC, [July-Dec.] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No.
43, at 1916 (Oct. 30, 1985) (ABA arguing that Marine Bank supported narrow interpretation
of context clause to discourage overlapping regulation).
132. Id.
133. See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 558-59 (considering regulatory context in applying
context clause to determine meaning of "security" under '34 Act).
134. Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 556-58 (considering adequacy of banking regulations to
protect investors in FDIC-insured CDs).
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regulations to satisfy the investor protection function of the '34 Act.' 3
Applying the context clause, the Marine Bank Court determined that the
adequacy of federal banking regulations to protect investors in FDIC-insured
certificates of deposit was a "context" requiring departure from the '34
Act's specific definition of "security" which otherwise would include FDICinsured certificates of deposit. 3 6 Conversely, the inadequacy of federal
banking regulations to protect investors that trade securities through banks
offering brokerage services is a context indicating that banks doing brokerage
business are not banks within the bank exemption of the '34 Act.' a" Therefore, under the Marine Bank Court's analysis, the SEC properly interpreted
the context clause as authority for adopting rule 3b-9 requiring banks doing
brokerage business to register as broker-dealers.'
As the SEC determined in adopting rule 3b-9, imposing the brokerdealer registration requirement on banks doing brokerage business fills the
void in federal protection of investors trading securities. 3 9 Banks attempting
to side-step the broker-dealer registration requirement by affiliating a brokerdealer or by establishing a subsidiary will not compromise the investor
protection purpose of the '34 Act, because the '34 Act imposes the registration requirement on bank subsidiaries and affiliates.4° Moreover, by reducing
the economic incentives for banks to conduct brokerage business, rule 3b-9
may provide the unintended benefit of deterring banking practices that
arguably violate the Glass-Steagall Act which prohibits banks from engaging
in most securities activities.' 4' In this sense, rule 3b-9 may do double duty in
42
guarding the integrity of the financial industry.
Notwithstanding the possible benefits of rule 3b-9, the propriety of its
adoption depended upon factual construction of the context clause, a practice
that Congress probably did not intend and that contradicts the Supreme
Court's unchallenged textual construction of the context clause in National
Securities.4 1 Congress, therefore, should clarify the SEC's power to regulate
135. See id. at 556-59 (Marine Bank Court concerned with investor protection and overlapping federal regulation).

136. See id. (determining that banking regulation of FDIC-insured CDs adequately served
investor protection purpose of '34 Act).
137. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (federal banking regulation is inadequate to
regulate bank securities activities),
138. See supra notes 111-37 and accompanying text (analysis of Marine Bank opinion
relevant to SEC's power under context clause to adopt rule 3b-9),
139. See SEC Rule, supra note 8, at 1264 (uniform regulation of securities activities best
serves investor protection function of '34 Act); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text
(identifying regulation-by-function approach to securities regulation); note 14 and accompanying
text (suggesting deficiency of bank regulations to regulate bank securities activities).
140. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(I) (1982) (persons doing brokerage business must register with

SEC).
141. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (rule 3b-9 reduces brokerage revenues

of banks whether banks handle brokerage accounts internally or through affiliates or subsidiaries).
142. fd,
143. See supra notes 76-94 and accompanying text (legislative history and National Securites suggesting impropriety of factual context approach to context clause).
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banks doing brokerage business by repealing or narrowing the bank exemption from the broker-dealer registration requirement of the '34 Act. Further,
the Supreme Court should clarify its position on the proper construction of
the context clause in light of the Court's inconsistent approaches to the
clause in National Securities and Marine Bank. By declaring the proper
construction of the context clause, the Supreme Court will help the lower
federal courts applying the clause perpetuate Congress' intent. In the meantime, rule 3b-9 is valuable as an interim measure to reconcile the dynamics
of the banking industry with the investor protection function of the '34 Act.
MICHAEL
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